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INVOLUNTARY

CONFESSIONS

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF STATE
CRIMINAL CONFESSION CASES IN THE
U S. SUPREME COURT
WILFRED . RITr*

A quarter of a century ago, in 1936, the U. S. Supreme Court for
the first time reviewed and set aside a state conviction of a defendant
accused of a violation of state law, on the ground that the admission
into evidence of a confession had violated the fourteenth amendment
prohibition against a state depriving a person of life or liberty without due process of law.' In all, during the twenty-five years that have
passed since this first decision in Brown v. MissIssIpp, 2 the U.S.
Supreme Court has reviewed thirty-one cases, not counting denials of
petitions of certiorari, involving state convictions alleged to have
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Va.
During this quarter century the subject has been extensively written upon. The
principal law articles are:
McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Tex. L. Rev. 447,
15"57 (1938);
McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 Tex. L. Rev. 239-78 (i946),
Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 Il.
L. Rev. 442-63 (1948);
Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw.L.
Rev. 16 (1953).
Gorfinkel, The Fourteenth Amendment and State Criminal Proceedings"Ordered Liberty" or "Just Deserts", 41 Calif. L. Rev. 672-91 (1953);
Miller, The Supreme Court's Review of Hypothetical Alternatives in a State
Confession Case, 5 Syracuse L. Rev. 52-61 (1953);
Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between
Judge and Jury, 2i U. Chi. L. Rev. 317-54 (1954);
Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 Stanf. L. Rev.
1

111-37 (1954);
Scott, State Criminal Procedure, The Fourteenth Amendment, and Prejudice,
,19 Nw. U.L. Rev. 319-32 (1954);

Arens and Meadows, Psycholinguistics and the Confession Dilemma, 56 Colum.
L. Rev. 19-46 (1956);
Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, in Symposium,
Are the Courts Handcuffing the Police? 52 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77-89 (1957);
Liebowitz, Safeguards in the Law of Interrogation and Confession, in Sympostum. Are the Courts Handcuffing the Police?, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 86-89 (1957);
The Law of Arrests, Police Detention, and Confession Admissibility (A Bibliography), Oo J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 175-85 (1950).
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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been obtained by the use of involuntary confessions. The Court reversed twenty-two convictions3 and affirmed nine convictions.
The large majority of these cases involved convictions for heinous
crimes and literally presented questions of life and death. Twenty-five
cases, or 8o per cent of the total, involved convictions for murder,
with the death penalty having been imposed in nineteen cases and life
imprisonment in the other six. Two involved convictions of manslaughter, with ten-year and three-year sentences imposed. There
were two cases of rape and one of burglary with intent to commit rape,
with the death sentence imposed in all three. There was one robbery
conviction in which a ten-year sentence had been imposed.
The U. S. Supreme Court reversed fourteen and affirmed five of the
nineteen convictions of murder in which the death sentence had been
imposed. It reversed all three of the other convictions carrying the
death penalty, two for rape -and one for burglary with intent to commit rape. Three of the murder convictions carrying life sentences
were reversed and three affirmed. The manslaughter conviction carrying the ten-year sentence was affirmed and the one with the threeyear sentence was reversed. The robbery conviction with the tenyear penalty was affirmed.
All of these cases involve confessions in the sense that there has
been "an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused in a
3
A short textual discussion of these reversals is contained in the 1961 report of
the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Book 5 entitled Justice at pages 16-i8
under the title "The third degree and coercion of confessions." The same publication in Appendix VII, table i, pp. 256-62, gives a list of "Reversals of convictions
based on coerced confessions, The U.S. Supreme Court (Feb. 17, 1936, to June 12,
i96i)." Although the text at p. 17 refers to 21 reversals, this list includes 22 cases.
The discrepancy probably is explained by the inclusion in the appendix list of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the stomach pump case; Rochin is excluded from
the present article as it probably was from the Civil Rights Commission s tdxtual
compilation as not being a confession case. The appendix to the Civil Rights Commission report does not include Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 881 (1949), a case
which is included in this article.
The material for this article was prepared without reference to the race of the
defendants. The Justice appendix shows that Negro defendants were involved in
fourteen of the cases and white defendants in six, with the race not given in the
other two. (The text of the Civil Rights Commission report at p. 17 says "at least
the victims [defendants?] were Negroes.")
12 of
The appendix to the Civil Rights Commission report undertakes to describe
in tabular form the incidents that brought about the U.S. Supreme Court reversal
in each case. These descriptions should be used with some caution. For example,
infer that
both the text of the report at p. 17 and the appendix at p. 262 strongly
•
physical coercion was used in Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (i96 ). The opinion of
the Court, however, was based on the premise "that the officers did not inflict
deliberate physical abuse or injury upon Reck during the period they held him in
their custody." 367 U.S. at 440.
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"4 While a
confession is a form of admission, the latter term is broader and
also covers an admission as to a matter that only tends to show guilt
of crime and which does not constitute the acknowledgment of guilt
itself.5 Although these cases deal only with confessions proper, it
would seem that the Sipreme Court in appropr.,a'te cases would
extend the same rules to admissions that are not confessions.
The Supreme Court has acted unanimously in nine cases and
divided in twenty-two cases, that is, all members of the Court have
been agreed on the law and its application in less than 30 per cent
of the cases.
Ot the eleven cases decided between 1936 and 1948, beginning with
Brown v. Missssippi in 1936, and up to, but not including Haley v.
OhioO in 1948, the Supreme Court reversed nine state judgments and
affirmed two. However, significantly, of the nine reversals seven were
unanimous, 7 while only two reversals S and two affirmancesO were by
divided courts. The first six cases in this series, those between 1936 and
10
In 1941, divisions in the Court
1941, were decided upanimously.
appeared and by 1948 these divisions on the law and its application
had seemingly become irreconcilable.
Of the twenty decisions between 1948 and 1961, there were affirm1
ances of state convictions in seven cases-all by divided courts." Of

criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged. .

Wigmore, Evidence § 821 at 238 (3d ed. 1940). wigmore completes the definition with the phrase "or of some essential part of it." In all the Supreme Court
cases being considered the accused admitted the crime itself.
G"A confession is a voluntary statement made by a person in which he acknowledges himself to be guilty of an offense or discloses the evidence of the act and the
share or participation which he had in it. The distinction between a confession
anti an admission is that the latter is only a self-incriminating statement short
of an acknowledgement of guilt, or a statement of an isolated or independent act
tending only to show guilt or criminal intent." Hawk v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky.
217, i.14, SAV.2d 496, 499 (194o).
43

U.S. 596 (1948).
'Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940); Canty v. Alabama, 3o9 U.S. 629 (194o); White v. Texas, 3o9 U.S. 631, re"332

hearing denied, 3io U.S. 530 (1941); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941); Ward

v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547

(1942).

8Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401
(1945)-

OLisenba v. California, 313 U.S. 537, 314 U.S. 219 (ig4i); Lyons v. Oklahoma,
322 U-S. 596 (1944)-

ISupra note 7, first cases cited.
22Gallegos v. Nebraska 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Stroble v. California, 343 US. i8i
(1952); Stein v. New York, 946 U.S. 156 0(953); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390
(1958); Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433
(i958); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
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the thirteen reversals of state court convictions, two were by unanimous
courts,1 2 and eleven by divided courts.'-"
In summary, then, during the first half of the period under review
during which the U. S. Supreme Court has supervised state convictions
involving confessions, that is, between 1936 and 1948, the Court acted
unanimously in seven of eleven cases, or in 64 per cent of the total.
During the second half of the period, between 1948 and i96i, the
Court acted unanimously in only two cases, or in io per cent of the
total. Conversely, of course, the divisions in the Court's membership
have increased from 36 per cent of the cases in the first half of the
period to 9o per cent of -the cases in the second half.
Perhaps of greater signifioance, though, has been the fact that frequently the Court has not been able to agree on an opinion.14 Thus
in 1945 and 1948 the Court reversed state convictions of murder by
5-4 decisions, but in opinions the Court was split 4-1-4. 15, Again, in
1949 in Watts v. Indiana'6 a state conviction of murder was reversed
by a 6-3 vote, but in opinions the Court split 3-1-1-1-3. Also in 1949,
in Turner v. Pennsylvarnai7 and Harris v. South Carolina's state convictions of murder were reversed by 5-4 decisions, with the opinions
split 3-1-1-1-3. The phenomenon was not a passing one, for the latest
decision involving confessions, Culombe v. Connecticut, 9 shows
a reversal by a 6-3 vote, but a 2-1-3-3 opinion split.
This article will undertake to discuss three principal questions that
have divided the Supreme Court in the confession cases. On first impression the questions seem to be so elementary that their answers
would be relatively easy to find. But the contrary seems to have been
the reality. Answers that are clear, concise, and consistent are yet to
"Spano v. New York, 36o U.S. 315 (1959); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199

(1960)
"Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949): Turner
v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949);
Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 881 (g5o); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954);
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958),
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (96); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
"In Lisenba v. California, 313 U.S. 537 (1941), the judgment below was first
affirmed by an equally divided court; on rehearing the judgment was affirmed by
an 8-2 decision. 314 U.S. 219 (1941). In Gallegos v. Nebraska, 3.12 U.S. 55 (1951),
the state judgment of conviction was affirmed by a 6-2 vote, but with the opiions
split 4-2-2.
"5Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1918).
'6338 U.S. 49 (1949).
17338 U.S. 62 (1949).
'338 U.S. 68 (1949)"367 U.S. 568 (1961).
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be given. These questions are: I. What is an involuntary confession?
II. What is the reason for excluding involuntary confessions from
evidence? III. How is the fact that a confession is involuntary determined? The thesis proposed and the conclusion drawn is that the
answers to all three of these questions are so closely related as to be
essentially one and that it, while often hinted at, even stated, has
never been fully and openly acknowledged.
A second article will consider the subsequent histories of the confession cases that have been reversed by the U. S. Supreme Court, and
on the basis of that material and the analysis presented in this article,
conclusions will be drawn as to the present value and the future of this
particular type of Supreme Court control of state criminal proceedings.
I.

WHA-T

Is AN

INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION?

An involuntary confession was early defined, in 1783 in Warickshall's Case,20 as one "forced from the mind by the flattery of hope,
or by the torture of fear."2 1 The U. S. Supreme Court speaks in terms
of this traditional definition, with the understanding that the torture
of fear includes fear induced by both physical and psychological coercion.22 The character of a confession as voluntary or involuntary
is said to depend upon the state of mind of the person confessing. Mr.
Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court in Reck v. Pate2 3 said, "The
question in each oase is whether a defendant's will was overborne
at the time he confessed." 24 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Culombe v.
Connecticut,25 undertook to give a somewhat fuller statement of what
an involuntary confession is, and how its character is ascertained. He
said:
"The inquiry whether, in a particular case, a confession was
voluntarily or involuntarily made involves, at the least, a threephased process. First, there is the business of finding the crude
historical facts, the external, 'phenomenological' occurrences
and events surrounding the confession. Second, because the con-aiLeach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783).
'Id., i Leach at 263-64, 168 Eng. Rep. at 235.
"The American Law Institute, Model Code of Evidence, Rule 505 (i942),
defines involuntary confessions in terms of the "infliction of physical suffering..
or threats thereof" to the person confessing, and "threats or promises," likely to
cause a false statement, made by a person reasonably believed to have authority
and made with reference to the particular crime. There also may be a threat in the
sense that unless the defendant confesses he may expect no leniency from the court.
People v. Brommel, 15 Cal. Rptr. 9o9. 36.1 P.2d 845 (1961).
2367 US. 433 (ig6i).
*'ld. at 440.

-367 U.S. 568 (ig6i).
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cept of 'voluntariness' is one which concerns a mental state,
there is the imaginative recreation, largely inferential, of internal 'psychological' fact. Third, there is the application to this
psychological fact of standards for judgment informed by the
larger legal conceptions ordinarily characterized as rules of law
but which, also, comprehend both induction from, and anticipation of, factual circumstances." 26
According to these expressions, both voluntariness and involuntariness are viewed by the Court as particular states of mind, common
to all men-to the mature and the young, to the intelligent and the
ignorant. In this respect they are comparable to other states of mind
long familiar in the criminal law, which cause the defendant to act
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.27 The voluntary and
involuntary states of mind are ascertainable constants, although existing in persons of very different physical and personality characteristics.
Thus, two principal factors seem to be involved in determining
whether a particular individual had a voluntary or involuntary state
of mind at the time he confessed: (i) the individual's personal characteristics; and (2) the pressures that were applied to induce the confession. As Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court, in Stein v. New
York said:
"The limits in any case depend upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person
confessing. What would be overpowering to the weak of will or
mind28might be utterly ineffective against an experienced criminal."
An involuntary state of mind results when the strength of the pressures applied to induce the confession exceed the resistance of the
person confessing. In other words, there must be a causal connection
between the methods used by the police to obtain the confession and
the defendant's act of confessing.
The concept of "cause" is familiar in the criminal law. A situation
somewhat analogous to the confession cases is to be found where insanity is raised as a defense to the defendant's being held criminally
responsible for an act which he admittedly committed. Under the
Durham test of insanity,29 to use an example recently formulated, the
defendant is not criminally responsible if he suffers from a mental disease or defect which caused his anti-social act. Nevertheless, an ac-Id. at 603.
!This listing is taken from the A.L.I., Model Penal Code § 2.02 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955). See also § 201.1 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
'346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953). See also Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, z98 (9,r7).
-ODurham v. United States, 214 F.2d 8602 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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cused suffering from a mental disease or defect "would still be responsible for his unlawful act if there was no causal connection between
such mental abnormality and the act."30 In the same way, it would
seem, a person might confess after the police had used improper
methods to secure such a confession, without the improper methods having caused the confession. It is, of course, difficult to
establish whether or not the defendant's confession was in fact caused
by the actions of the police. But such an inquiry should be no more
difficult than establishing whether or not the defendant's act was
caused by his mental disease or defect. In the confession cases, at least,
the defendant may be of sane mind, a condition of mind more susceptible of understanding by the trier of facts, than the mind that has
a disease or defect.
From the standpoint of law enforcement officials, though, this analysis is something of an oversimplification. A court with the benefit of
hindsight seeks to determine whether at the critical time the defendant's anti-social act was the product of mental disease or defect or
whether at the time of confessing the accused had a voluntary or involuntary state of mind. On the other hand, where confessions are
involved, law enforcement officials must recognize the subtle change
in the accused from a voluntary to an involuntary state of mind, unless
the law enforcement officials are to be required to stop seeking to obtain a confession at some point in time before the defendant does confess.
So long as the accused asserts his innocence, he has, by definitton,
a voluntary state of mind. It is not until the accused finally does confess that his statements can be termed "involuntary." When he confesses he may be doing so voluntarily, or he may be confessing because
his will has been overborne and so he is making an involuntary confession. How can it be determined which he is doing?
If two persons with the same physical and mental characteristics,
one guilty and one innocent of the crime with which he is charged, are
subjected to the same pressures, the guilty one will confess sooner than
the innocent person. This is because the innocent person will have the
strength -that innocence gives, and moreover, he will be able to husband whatever strength he has, since he will not be subjected to the
pressures of lying and trying to cover up the irreconcilable contradictions that will develop in his story. To deny this would be to deny
that truth and innocence are greater sources of strength than falsehood
and guilt.
"Ild. at 875.
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A test then, probably the best test, of whether the defendant confessed voluntarily or involuntarily is whether the confession is true or
false. If it is true, that is, if the defendant is guilty, it must be presumed that he confessed sooner than an innocent person with the same
personal characteristics subjected to the same amount of pressure
would have. Therefore, the confession of this particular individual is
the product of guilt and not the product of the pressures exerted by
the police. On the other hand, if the confession had been false, that
is the accused is innocent, the defendant's will must have in fact been
overborne because he made a false acknowledgment of guilt as a
preferable alternative to further subjection to outside pressure.
This leads to the conclusion that if an involuntary confession is
defined as "one forced from the mind," 3' 1 or as one coerced from an
involuntary state of mind, then two corollary propositions must also
be accepted. These are: (1)A confession can only be considered involuntary if it was the product of or caused by the methods used by
law enforcement officers during the period when the confession was
made. (2) The guilt or innocence of the accused is of compelling relevancy to the question of whether the police methods in fact caused the
accused to confess.
The latest expressions from the U. S. Supreme Court shows that
these two corollary propositions are no longer being accepted. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Rogers v. Richmond3 2
said that the question in a confession case is:
"[W]hether the behavior of the State's law enforcement officials
zoas such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring
about confessions not freely self-determined-a question to be
answered with complete .disregard of whether or not petitioner
in fact spoke the truth."'
The emphasis here is on the behavior of the police, rather than on the
effect of that behavior on the accused. The question is not the factual
one of whether the police behavior did in fact overbear the defendant's
will, but the hypothetical one of whether the police behavior was of
such a nature as to overbear the defendant's will.
The conclusion to be drawn is that while the Court still couches
its opinions in terms of a factual inquiry into the state of the defendant's mind at the time of confessing, the Court has actually abandoned this approach. The Court is more concerned with the nature of
the methods used by the police at the time the confession was obtained
SiSupra note 21.
365 U.S. 534 (161)MId. at 544. (Emphasis added.)
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than with tile effect those methods had on the particular individual.
This point can be more fully developed by considering the reasons
that are given for excluding involuntary confessions from evidence.
1I.

WVItHAT is TiIE REASON FOR ExCLUDING INN OLUNTARY
CONFESSIONS FROM EVIDENCE?

Historically, involuntary confessions were excluded from admission into evidence against persons accused of crime on the theory that
they had been obtained under such conditions that they were, as Wigmore said, "untrustworthy as testimony,"34 since a person whose confession follows physical or psychological torture very possibly confessed to terminate the torture, rather than because he committed
the crime.3 5 Wignore took the view that this principle of testimonial
untrustworthiness excluded, necessarily, a doctrine that confessions
are excluded because of any illegality in the methods by which they
are obtained. " 0 Professor McCormick, however, suggested that the
exclusion of confessions obtained by force or fear savored of privilege.3 7 He wrote:

"[ilt seems clear that while the policy on which all rules of
competency are founded, the policy of safeguarding the trustworthiness of evidence admitted, has had an ancillary role in
shaping the rules restricting the admission of confessions, the
predominant motive of the courts has been that of protecting
the citizen against the violation of his privileges of immunity
from bodily manhandling by the police, and from the other
of the 'third degree.' "38
undue pressures
In its consideration of the first confession cases the Supreme Court
seems quite clearly to have been motivated by an evidence theory,
that an involuntary confession is not competent evidence because it
is untrustworthy. In the first case, Brown v. Mississippi, the defendants', claim was that the confessions had been obtained by physical
3

IVigmnore, Evidence § 882 at 246 (3 d ed. 1940).

nWigmore even considered use of the terms voluntary and involuntary to be
unsound. Id., § 824 at 251-52.
2Id., § 823 at 248-49.
3,McCormick. The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Tex. L. Rev.
117,-152-53 (1938). McCormick agreed that the exclusion of confessions because of
promises of leniency must rest on a principle of untrustworthiness, since no outside
interest meriting a privilege is involved. Id.at 455-56.
;"McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 2 'rex. L. Rev. 239, 245 (1946). Professor Morgan also has taken the view
that the question is one of privilege. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn.L. Rev. 1, 27-30 (1949).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

44

torture and that they were "false."'

9

[Vol. XIX

In reversing, Chief Justice Hughes

said, "Aside from the confessions, there was no evidence sufficient to
warrant the submission of the case to the jury,"'' and that a trial is
"a mere pretense where the state authorities have contrived a conviction resting solely upon confessions obtained by violence." 4' A
unanimous Court in 19jo in Chambers v. Florida42 extended the same
doctrine to psychological torture or coercion. Four per curiam reversals by a unanimous Court followed in 1940-4.3 z
The unanimity of the Court, though, had ended in 1941 with the
case of Lisenba v. California, in which a conviction of murder, carry44
ing the death penalty, was first affirmed by an equally divided Court
and after rehearing affirmed by a seven-to-two vote.45 In Lisenba, the

Court for the first time seems to have recognized that the evidence
theory of untrustworthiness did not provide a satisfactory constitutional basis for overturning state convictions. Reversal on the basis
that the confessions are not trustworthy or credible is only another
0
way of saying that -the evidence does not support the verdict.' If
state convictions are to be set aside because the defendant's confession
is not credible, convictions may also be set aside because the prosecutrix's testimony in a rape case or the accomplice's testimony in a
murder case is not believable. Once it is accepted that the U.S. Supreme Court can review state convictions to determine whether the
evidence supports -the conviction, a whole large new area for Supreme
Court review has been opened. 47 In fact, since a defense motion that
the evidence does not support the verdict is virtually routine, the
Supreme Court could review practically any state conviction on this
basis. In 1941 in Lisenba the Court began to search for a constitutional, as distinguished from a common law, basis for setting aside
state convictions based on involuntary confessions. In addition the
Court was becoming concerned with the fact-finding process and the
'297 U.S. at 278.
'OId. at 279.
d. at 286.
"309 U.S. 227 (1940)G3Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940); White v. Texas, 309 U.S. 631, rehearing
denied 3I0 U.S. 530 (1940); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941); Vernon v. Alabama,
313 U.S. 547 (1940"313 U.S. 537 (1940
'5314 U.S. 219 (1941).
"The Court said that a trial judge's refusal to direct a verdict on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence would not be a denial of due procms. Id. at 227.
4
7The door to this type of review has already been cracked since the Court is
now reviewing cases to determine whether the convictions are "totally devoid of
evidentiary support." Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 163 (i96s); Thompson v.
City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
41
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basis by which it, as an appellate court, re-examined and re-determined
facts duly found by the state judiciaries. These problems led Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the majority in Lisenba, to say:
"[T]he fact that the confessions have been conclusively adjudged
by the decision below to be admissible under State law, notwithstanding the circumstances under which they were made, does
not answer the question whether due process was lacking. The
aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was voluntarily made is to exclude false evidence. Tests are invoked
to determine whether the inducement to speak was such that
there is a fair risk the confession is false. These vary in the
several States
The aim of the requirement of due process
is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent
fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true
or false. The criteria for decision of that question may differ
from those appertaining
to the State's rule as to the admissi48
bility of a confession."
Under the Lisenba view a confession could be voluntary under state
law so as to be competent evidence and yet involuntary under federal constitutional law so that its admission would constitute "Fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence." Such a distinction might
be satisfactory if the competency of evidence was solely a question
of state law and if federal constitutional adjudication was not a funcuon of the state judiciaries. The former proposition is contrary to the
rationale of Brown v. Mississippi that confessions obtained by physical torture are so inherently untrustworthy as evidence that to base a
conviction thereon is to deny due process of law to the defendant.
The latter proposition simply ignores that state courts are also expected to apply federal constitutional law. It was, therefore, inevitable that the Lisenba could not last long.
Before the rationale in state confession cases had been more
clearly resolved, the Supreme Court in 1943 decided McNabb v.
United States19 in a way designed to curb police interrogation abtses.5 0
The Court said, "Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts inplies the duty of establishing and
maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence."' ' 1 While
the decision did not apply to state confession cases, and in fact rested
"314 U.S. at 236 . Justices Black and Douglas dissented, being of the opinion
that the facts showed the confessions were "the result of coercion and compulsion."
[d at 241.
'"318 U.S. 332 (1943).

'4nhau, The Confession Dilenmma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 Ill.

L. Rev.

442,

443 (1948).

3'318 U. S. at 34o.
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on the basis that different considerations apply to the Court's review
of state and federal cases, nevertheless its philosophy has influenced
the state cases. McNabb recognized a basis for excluding certain con52
fessions, even though they are termed voluntary.
The influence of McNabb is evident in the majority opinion in
Ashcraft v. Tennessee'53 in which Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the
Court, said that thirty-six hours of continuous questioning was "so
inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom."' 4 Mr. Justice Jackson argued in dissent
that the Court was creating an irrebuttable presumption, or rule of
law, that any confession obtained as the result of extended police
interrogation was involuntary, without any inquiry as to the actual
effect of the coercion of extended questioning on the mind of the
person confessing. ",' Justice Jackson, though, was prepared to go along
with the irrebuttable presumption where actual or threatened violence was involved. He said, "We need not be too exacting about
proof of the effects of such violence on the individual involved, for
their effect on the human personality is invariably and seriously demoralizing."56
Ashcraft thus represents an abandonment of a causal connection
as an essential requirement to finding a confession to be involuntary,
so that under this decision it is no longer necessary to inquire into the
actual effect of the questioner's coercion on the person questioned.
There was no basic disagreement in Ashcraft between the majority and
dissenting justices as to whether a causal connecting requirement
should be abandoned, but only a disagreement as to when it should
be disregarded. Since Ashcraft the Court has taken an ambivalent
viewpoint. A confession is involuntary and must be excluded under
the fourteenth amendment if it is: (i) involuntary in fact, or (2) if It
is involuntary as a matter of law because obtained under circumstances that are inherently coercive. While the Court still prefers to
57
speak in terms of a factual involuntariness, more realisticly viewed,
the reversing decisions are based on findings of involuntariness as a
matter of law.
-1I-he whole rationale of excluding certain confessions was somewhat further
confused when Mr. Justice Reed, the single dissenter, said, that invohtutar) confessions in the federal courts are excluded because they are "violative of the provision
of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights." 318 U.S. at 349.
3322 U.S. 143 (1944).
:'Id. at i547Id. at 156, 157-58. Justices Roberts and Frankfurter joined in the dissent.
"Id. at 16o.
57See text supra at notes 23-26.
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The abandonment of a causal requirement also involved the necessary abandonment of an evidence or trustworthiness test as the basis
for excluding involuntary confessions. In order for a confession to be
untrustworthy because coerced, it must be shown that the coercion
caused the confession. If the coercion did not cause the confession, it
cannot be said that the confession is untrustworthy, because in such
a situation the person confessing is not doing so as a preferable alternative to being subjected to continued pressure.
A little more than a month after Ashcraft abandoned a causal requirement, and so an evidence theory of trustworthiness, the Court
in Lyons v. Oklahoma s returned to an evidence theory, and so by
inference to the causal requirement. However, Lyons v. Oklahoma illustrates the abstract nature of Supreme Court review of confession
cases and the inconsistencies that develop in the process.
The case involved a triple murder, followed by arson to conceal the
crime. The defendant confessed orally after about ten hours of questioning, during which time "a pan of the victims' bones was placed in
Lyons' lap by his interrogators to bring about his confession." 59 Later,
Lyons signed a written confession, and it was this second confession,
not the first, that was introduced into evidence. The federal question,
according to the Court, was whether the second confession was involuntary, because obtained as a result of "the continuing effect of
the coercive practices." G° that procured the "admittedly involuntary"
first confession."' The Court said, "The voluntary or involuntary character of a confession is determined by a conclusion as to whether the
accused, at the time he confesses, is in possession of 'mental freedom'
to confess or to deny a suspected participation in a crime." 62 A majority of the Court concluded that the second confession was volun03

tary.

The Court seems to have taken different approaches in considering
the tM.o confessions in the case. As regards the first "inoluntary" conIe,!ion the Court did not require any causal connection between the
police methods and the confession, but as regards the second "voluntary" confession the Court found that it was voluntary because no
causal connection between the police methods and the confession had
been established. The first confession was obtained after about ten
U.S. 596 (1944).
-"1d.at 599-60o.
OId. at 6o'.
01
1d. at 597.
12Id. at 602.
Three justices dissented.
-'322
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hours of questioning, a period considerably less than that in Ashcraft.
The evidence as to physical violence was conflicting, and so presumably
not relied upon by the Court. The only other undisputed fact mentioned in the Court's opinion was the use of the pan of the victims'
bones. This apparently was what led the Court to say, "Here improper
"64
methods were used to obtain a confession.
The effect on a guilty person of being forced to hold a pan of the
victims' bones is quite easy to imagine. But would the effect be the
same on an innocent person? Would it induce a false confession, or
might it not have precisely the opposite effect, strengthening the person in maintaining his innocence? Since no inquiry was made into the
matter it seems apparent that the Court found this police method to
secure a confession to be improper without reference to the causal
effect on the individual involved.
If the first confession in Lyons was truly involuntary it seems quite
unrealistic to assume that a removal of the pressure that brought about
the confession would give back to the defendant, without reference
to his guilt or innocence, the "mental freedom" he had before confessing. If the defendant was innocent and the threat of force was removed he would regain "mental freedom", the natural reaction being
to repudiate the confession immediately. On the other hand a guilty
defendant would recognize that he had given away the truth, so that
another confession could do him no additional harm. It is too much
to expect, unless the defendant has been advised by counsel, that the
confessing defendant will know the law so well that he will act on the
basis that the first confession was involuntary and inadmissible into
evidence. Consequently, the second confession, which was made when
the person was free to repudiate the first one, constitutes strong evidence of guilt. To deny that the first confession, no matter how obtained, is not a strong inducing factor to obtaining the second confession is to ignore realities.65 But this approach permitted the Court to
return again to an evidence rationale as the basis for review. Mr. Justice Reed said, "A coerced confession is offensive to basic standards of
justice, not because the victim has a legal grievance against the police,
but because declarations procured by torture are not premises from
which a civilized forum will infer guilt." 66
"Id. at 6o2.
OThe dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Murphy, with which Justice Black concurred, took the view that the second confession was influenced by the coercive atmosphere that induced the first confession, and so violated a constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination. Id. at 6o 5 . Mr. Justice Rutledge also dissented
without opinion. Id. at 6o5.
Id. at 605. The problem was involved again in Malinski v. New York, 324
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In a series of cases beginning in 1945,67 continuing through 1948,61
and 194969 the Court was so badly split that no single opinion could

obtain adherence of a majority. In 1949 the nature of these conflicting
positions became clarified. Five justices were espousing a due process
theory, of somewhat varying degrees of stringency, as the basis of exclusion, while four justices were still adhering to an evidence theory.
In 1949 in Watts v. Indiana,70 Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed his
view7' of the due process theory of exclusion as being derived from an
Anglo-American system of criminal justice that is "accusatorial as
opposed to the inquisitorial system" 72 so that "the Due Process Clause
bars police procedure which violates the basic notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime." 73 Mr. Justice Black, as shown by
citation of authority, preferred to adhere to the views he had voiced in
Ashcraft.7 4 Mr. Justice Douglas was now prepared to go the farthest
down the due process route, extending the doctrines of McNabb to the
states and outlawing any confession obtained during a period of unlawful detention. 75 The other four justices 76 continued to adhere to a
view that involuntary confessions are excluded because of their untrustworthy nature as evidence, and would accept state determinations
on this question as very nearly conclusive.
Although membership on the Court has changed since 1949 this
general pattern of disagreement is still evident. Most significant,
though, from the standpoint of the development of a rationale, has
been the fact that three of the five justices who in 1949 espoused a due
process theory have remained on the bench until 1962, while all four
of 'the justices favoring the evidence theory have been replaced. With
a nucleus of three justices77 in favor of the due process theory, except
U.S. 401 (1945), but since a majority of the Court found that the first confession,
dhe coerced one, was considered by the jury, a reversal of the conviction was placed
on that basis.
GIMalinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
clHaley v. Ohio, 332 U-S. 596 (1948).
OWatts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pcnnsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949);
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
'0338 US. 49 (1948).
"'Concurred in by Justices Murphy and Rutledge.
721d.
7Id.

at 54.
at 55.

"Id. at 55.
71d. at 57.
7Chief Justice Vinson, and Justices Reed, Burton, and Jackson.
7Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas. While Justice Frankfurter frequently disagrees with the other two justices on questions of application, all three espouse the due process theory.

50

IVISHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

for a brief period during the early 195o's,78 this theory has prevailed.
So far, however, the Court and the individual justices have not been
willing to rely upon the due process theory exclusively, preferring
whenever possible to rely upon both it and an evidence theory. This
is evident in such cases as Spano v. New York 79 in which Chief Justice
Warren said:
"The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police
must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life
and liberty can -be as much endangered from illegal methods
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual
criminals themselves." 8 0
Two years later, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court,
in Rogers v. Richmondsi set forth the due process theory as the sole
reason for excluding involuntary confessions. He said:
"Our decisions under that Amendment have made clear that
convictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product of coercion, either
physical or psychological, cannot stand. This is so not because
such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods
used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law- that ours is an accusatorial and
not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured
prove its charge against an accused out
and may not by coercion
' 2
of his own mouth."

And yet this opinion was hardly in print before the same Justice indirectly returned to the evidence theory in Culombe v. Connecticut
by outlining the nature of the inquiry in confession cases as involving
a search for the mental state that can be characterized as having the
quality of "voluntariness."S3 As has been pointed out such an inquiry
necessarily involves -a search for a causal connection between the po-8Justices Murphy and Rutledge, both of whom adhered to the due process
theory, died in 1949. Their successors, Justices Clark and Minton, favored the evidence theory. As a result in the early i95os a majority of the justices were following a trustworthiness test. This is evident in a series of cases affirming state convictions. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.s. 55 (;951); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181
(1952); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
-360 U-S. 315 (1959).
'OId. at 320-21.
-365 U.S. 534 (1961).
1
8 1d. at 540-41.
83See text supra at note 26.
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lice methods and the defendant's act of confessing, and such a search
is unrealistic unless the probable guilt or innocence of the defendant
is taken into account. And this is precisely the factor that Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said in Rogers must be excluded. The due process theory
denies the requirement of a causal connection between police methods
and the defendant's act of confessing, and so denies any real inquiry
into the quality of the defendant's mind at the time he confesses.

III. How Is THE

FACT THAT A CONFESSION

IS INVOLUNTARY DETERMINED?

In the final analysis, whether a confession is the product of an involuntary state of mind, and so an involuntary confession as traditionally defined, is a question of fact. This point, that a state of mind
is a fact, has never been made clearer than by Lord Justice Bowen, who
said, "[T]he state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his
digestion."8 4 No amount of discussion can clarify or obscure the fact
that the U. S. Supreme Court in reviewing state convictions and in
characterizing some confessions as voluntary and others as involuntary
is deciding questions of fact. No apologies are needed, for when the
Court is properly exercising an appellate jurisdiction, it has under the
Constitution a jurisdiction "both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make."8 5
Whether it is desirable for the Court to exercise this fact-finding function is -a different question, which it is not necessary to consider at
this point. Suffice it to say that the Court in confession cases follows
the rule that when the state prisoner claims his confession was involuntary,
"[W]e are bound to make an independent examination of
the record to determine the validity of the claim. The performance of this duty cannot be foreclosed by the finding of a
court, or the verdict of a jury, or both."80
In the first confession cases the U. S. Supreme Court found records,
which, in its opinion, established without doubt that the convictions
87
had been based on confessions that were involuntary or coerced. In
"'Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (C.A. 1885).
11tU.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
86Lisenba v. California, 314 US. 219, 237-38 (1941).
8Mr. Chief Justice Stone, dissenting in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 40i, 434
(1945), said of these early cases: "We have, in appropriate cases, set aside state convictions as violating due process where we were able to say that the case was improperly submitted to the jury or that the unchallenged evidence plainly showed

a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 US.
278; Chambers v. Florida, 3o9 U.S. 227; Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547." Id. at 438.
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the earliest cases the Court first ruled that confessions obtained by the
use of physical violence were involuntary, 8 and then extended the
rule to confessions obtained by psychological violence.8 9 The Court
thought the records were so clear in these early cases that it acted
unanimously and 'the applicable law seemed so clear that after the
first two decisions the Court only filed per curiam opinions. 90
In Lisenba v. Californza91 which came before the Court in 1941,
the Court was for the first time faced with a situation in which the evidence was conflicting and the state courts, after due deliberation in
light of the Brown decision, had resolved the issue in favor of voluntariness. 92 So the Court was presented with the question of the effect
to be given to a state court finding on conflicting evidence of the fact
that the confession was voluntary.
The Court made an independent examination of the evidence,
recognizing that this would be least difficult where "the evidence bearing upon the question is uncontradicted." 3 Since the majority's independent examination led to the same conclusion as had been reached
by the state court, that is, the confession was voluntary, the Court
experienced no difficulty in resolving conflicting evidence. However,
94
the Court did make an independent examination "of the record"
and not just of the uncontradicted evidence.
This issue of conflicting evidence was avoided in Ashcraft, since
the decision was based on the presence of a single uncontradicted fact,
a thirty-six hour period of questioning. 95 The problem, however,
could not be avoided in Malinski v. New York 90 in 1945 wherein the
evidence was not only conflicting as to the voluntariness of several
confessions, but as to whether a first confession had been submitted
'8 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
8'Ghambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
9°Canty v. Alabama, 809 U.S. 629 (i94o); White v. Texas, 809 U.S. 631 (i%10o, rehearing denied 31o U.S. 50 (1941); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (194t); Vermon v.
Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941).
91314 U.S. 219 (1941).
92It of course takes some considerable time for cases to reach the Supreme Court
involving police practices engaged in after and in light of one of the Court's decisions, such as that in Brown v. Mississippi. That decision was handed down on
February 17, 1936. 297 U.S. 278. The murder in Lisenba was committed in August,
1935, the defendant was arrested in April, 1936, and the confessions were made in
early May, 1936. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction in 1939,
which was before the second confession case, Chambers V. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, had
been decided on February 12, 1940.
9314 U.S. at 238.

"'See text supra at note 86.
O'Supra text beginning at note 53.
32,1 U.S. 401 (i945)-
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to the jury as a confession. 97 In delivering the opinion of the Court,
Mr. Justice Douglas, although he only spoke for himself and three
other justices, said:
"[T]he question whether there has been a violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the introduction of an involuntary confession is one on which we must
make an independent determination on the undisputed facts.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227; Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 2i9; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143."9
This formulation represented, where the evidence is in conflict, something of a subtle change in approach. In Chambers the Court found
that the record indisputably showed a coerced confession; in Ashcraft
the Court singled out a single undisputed fact that as a matter of law
made the confession involuntary; but in Lisenba where there was conflicting evidence the Court only said that it would make "an independent examination of the record,"99 not base a decision on the undisputed facts.
In his summation to the jury in Malinski, the prosecutor had indicated that the police are justified in letting the defendant "think he
is going to get a shellacking."' 1° This undisputed summation was
relied upon by Douglas "to fill in any gaps on the record before us
and to establish that this confession was not made voluntarily."' 01
However, Mr. Chief Justice Stone, speaking for himself and three
other justices in dissent, said: "The testimony as to whether the first
confession to the police was coerced was sharply conflicting,"1 02 and
he did not consider that the prosecutor's argument resolved the conflict. Therefore, he said, "The Court's decision thus sets aside the
conviction by the process of re-weighing the conflicting testimony as
to the alleged coercion, in the light of the arguments addressed to the
jury,"' 03 and so a state court jury verdict was being overturned "by
04
weighing the conflicting evidence on which it was based."'
7

1

0r only as

evidence relevant to the question of whether a second confession

was voluntary.
T

Id at 404. (Emphasis added.)
"OSee text supra at note 86.

'Id. at 407.

ImId. at 406.
1021d. at 435.
11Id. at 437-38.
2id. at 438. In light of these expressions it is odd that Mr. Justice Frankfurter
three years later said:
"[I]n all the cases that have come here dunng the last decade from the
courts of the various States in which it was claimed that the admission of
coerced confessions vitiated convictions for murder, there has been complete
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The Court's rule that it decides confession cases on the basis of
the uncontradicted facts only means that each justice reaches a conclusion on what to him are the uncontradicted facts, and not that the
members of the Court reach conclusions without disagreement as to
what the uncontradicted facts are. 10 5 In Malinski v. New York,10 6 all
agreed as to what the prosecutor said, but the members of the Court
disagreed as to whether this established physical violence as an uncontradicted fact.
Along with this "uncontradicted facts" rule of fact-finding, the
Court has developed a "total facts" rule. As Chief Justice Warren said
in Fikes v. Alabama, 0 7 the Court looks at "the totality of the circum",10s
stances that preceded the confessions.
The Court seems never to have recognized that the two rules are
quite contradictory. If the "total facts" are truly looked at, it is necessary to resolve conflicting evidence so as to obtain a complete picture.
An examination of "the totality of the circumstances that preceded the
confessions" -as evidenced by the uncontradicted facts is just that, and
no more; it is not a view of the total facts.
Essentially the Court's aproach seems to be a search for the single
uncontradicted detail that symbolizes the complete picture, and enables the Court to say that as a matter of law the confession was involuntary. Such a detail can be called a badge of coercion, by analogy
with the badges of fraud of the law of fraudulent conveyances. 0 9 In
Ashcraft v. Tennessee the badge of coercion was thirty-six hours of
continuous questioning. 1 0 In Malinsk v. New York, Mr. Justice Douglas found a badge of coercion in a sentence from the prosecutor's summation."' l In Watts v. Indiana, Mr. Justice Jackson found a badge of
' 2
coercion in "the State's admissions as to the treatment of Watts. "
agreement that any conflict in testimony as to what actually led to a contested confession is not this Court's concern. Such conflict comes here authoritatively resolved by the State's adjudication. Therefore only those elements of the events and circumstances in which a confession was involved
that are unquestioned in the State's version of what happened are relevant
to the constitutional issue here." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51-52 (i949).
21'An analogous situation is found where divided appellate courts reach a decision that reasonable men can or cannot differ on some particular point.
106324 U.S. 401 (1945).
107352 U.S. 191 (1957).
10
8Id. at 197. In Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 440 (1961), the Court said that "all the
circumstances attendant upon the confession must he taken into account" and referred to the "total combination of circumstances" and to "a totality of coercive
circumstances." Id. at 440, 442, 443.
1
01 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences § 35 (rev. ed. 9lo).
1

2Supra text beginning at note 53.

"'Supra text beginning at note ioo.
12339 U.S. 49, 60 (1949).
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In Payne v. Arkansas, Mr. Justice Harlan found a badge of coercion in
the somewhat ambiguous answers of the sheriff on cross-examination.11 3
The difficulties of fact-finding in an appellate court has led the
Supreme Court to make determinations of fact, independent of those
made by the state courts, on the basis of the "uncontradicted facts"
and the "total facts." Even if these two somewhat contradictory rules
can be resolved, the question is still left unanswered as to the effect to
be given to state determination of this same issue.
Presumably, the Court could take the view that it will accept state
determinations of the character of confessions as final, provided the
state has used the appropriate procedural machinery to make the determinations. In this way the Court would review, not the facts, but
the procedures by which the facts were found. Such a procedure is
quite consistent with appellate review, reviewing questions of law
rather than of fact. Superficially, at least, the problem has been complicated by the different techniques used by state courts to determine
when a confessionis voluntary.
Professor Meltzer has pointed out in a law review article on the
subjectli 4 that the trial procedures used to determine whether confessions are voluntary vary in the different states, the principal variations being in the allocation of responsibilities as between judge and
jury. Although often blurred, four basic approaches are discernible.
(i) The Orthodox View. The trial judge alone decides the question of
whether the confession is voluntary or involuntary, and if he rules it
to be voluntary the jury is bound to accept the confession as competent
evidence, although the jury will still pass on its credibility.'1 5 (2) The
raiThe defendant alleged that the sheriff said he would be protected from a
lynching mob of 3o to 40 people if he confessed. On cross examination the sheriff
was asked, "State whether or not anything was said to the defendant to the effect
that there would be 3o or 40 people there in a few minutes that wanted to get
him?" The answer was, "I told him that would be possible there would be that
many-it was possible there could be that many." It is possible that this statement
implied that the sheriff would protect the defendant from a mob, on condition
that he confessed. But it is also possible that the Sheriff only was admitting that
he made a statement of fact, and was not conditioning his protection of the prisoner on a confession. In reaching a conclusion that the confession was involuntary, Mr.
justice Harlan singled out this and five related questions and answers as requiring
acceptance of the claim that the confession was obtained by fear of mob violence.
,56 U.S. 560, 569 (1958).
1LMeltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between
Judge and Jury, 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1954).
iz"When the State offers a confession in a criminal trial and the defendant
objects on the ground it was not voluntary, the question thus raised is determined
hy the judge in a preliminary inquiry in the absence of the jury." State v. Outing,
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Massachusetts View. Although the judge makes the initial determination of whether or not the confession is voluntary, under certain circumstances -the jury may review a determination that it is voluntary
and nevertheless find it to be involuntary. 1i 6 (3)The New York View.
While the judge may rule a confession to be involuntary as a matter
of law, if he finds that reasonable men may differ, without himself
making any final determination he submits the issue of voluntariness
to the jury as a question of fact, under instructions to disregard the
confession if it is found -to be involuntary."17 (4) A Discretionary View.
25r, N.C. 468, 121 S.E.2d 847, 849 (ig6i). The State of Washington by a Rule of
Pleading has adopted this view. State v. Holman, 364 P.2d 921 (Wash. 1961). Professor Meltzer listed Washington as following the New York View, supra note 114
at 321 n. 21, but a more recent case from the state seems to embody an expression
of the Massachusetts View. State v. Haynes, 364 P.2d 935 (Wash. 1961).
""'[l~n this State the procedure followed as to confessions is that the admissibility is first determined by the trial court then, if admitted, it is submitted to the
jury for its ultimate determination." Parker v. State, 225 Md. 288, 170 A.2d 2io, l1
(1961).
1171n Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), Mr. Justice Jackson gave this
description of the New York View. "The procedure adopted by New York for exchiding coerced confessions relies heavily on the jury. It requires a preliminary
hearing as to admissibility, but does not permit the judge to make a final determination that a confession is admissible. He may-indeed, must-exclude any confession if he is convinced that it was not freely made or that a verdict that it was so
made would be against the weight of evidence. But, while he may thus cast the die
against the prosecution, he cannot do so against the accused. If the voluntariness
issue presents a fair question of fact, he must receive the confession and leave to the
jury, under proper instructions, the ultimate determination of its voluntary character and also its truthfulness. People v. Weiner, 248 N.Y. 118, 161 N.E. 441. The judge
it not required to exclude the jury while he hears evidence as to voluntanness,
People v. Brasch, 193 N.Y. 46, 85 N.E. 8og, and perhaps is not permitted to do so,
People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 159, 87 N.E. 112, 117." Id. at 172.
A recent expression from Texas of what seems to be the New York View is
as follows: "In the absence of the jury, the trial judge heard evidence on the voluntary character of the confession and concluded that it was not inadmissible as a
matter of law. But he recognized that there was an issue as to whether appellant's
confession was voluntary and in his charge instructed the jury that before they
could consider the statement they must find that no threats, duress or physical
violence was used to induce him to make the confession." Odis v. State, 345 S.W.2d
529, 530-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961).
Pennsylvania is also listed by Professor Meltzer as following the New York
View. Supra note 114 at 321 n. 2i. A recent case from Pennsylvania, though, indicates the lack of clarity with which the rule is often phrased. In one paragraph
the court, outside the presence of the
the Pennsylvania court said, "At trial
jury, held a hearing , after such hearing, the court decided that the question
of the voluntary nature of the confession was one of fact to be determined, under
appropriate instructions, by the jury." This would indicate that the trial judge,
finding the evidence to be in conflict, followed the New York View and did not
himself decide that the confession was voluntary, but left the issue to the jury. In
the very next paragraph, however, the court said, "On the state of this record both
the trial court and the jury acted with propriety in finding that Ross' confession
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The trial judge has discretion to follow the Orthodox View and make
his own ruling that the confession is voluntary-binding on the jury, or
he may follow the Massachusetts View and 'after ruling the confession
to be voluntary also give the jury a chance to pass on the issue." 8 It
is often difficult to determine under which of these four views a particular decision belongs. 119 And it seems that the distinctions in the
120
different views may be more semantical than real.
There is one characteristic that is common to all these state rules.
The trial judge must determine in the first instance whether as a matter of law a confession is inadmissible in evidence. He may do so for
one or both of two reasons: (1)the confession is untrustworthy as evidence, or (2) the confession was obtained by improper police methods
that make its use against the defendant unfair. This does not mean
that every confession excluded from evidence is necessarily untrustworthy; nor does it mean that every confession admitted into evidence
is necessarily trustworthy. An involuntary confession may in fact be
trustworthy, as where the confession provides leads that turn up additional evidence that demonstrates its truthfulness. The exclusion of
such a confession, no matter how strong the coercion by which it was
obtained, must rest on the second and not the first reason. In fact,
whenever a guilty person confesses, by definition the substance of the
confession is truthful and so factually trustworthy, whatever may be
the human evaluation of its credibility. On the other hand, an entirely voluntary confession may not be truthful, as where it is made
for the purpose of committing suicide, to assume responsibility for
was not obtained through duress or coercion and such confession was properly received in evidence and considered in determining Ross' guilt." Commonwealth v.
Ross, 403 Pa. 358, 169 A.2d 780, 784 (i96i). This last quotation may be a statement
of the New York View, but it is also subject to the interpretation that the trial
judge did find the confession to be voluntary, but also submitted the question
to the jury for its ultimate determination, a procedure which Professor Meltzer
calls the Massachusetts View.
uProfessor Meltzer cites Wilson v. United States, x62 U.S. 613 (1896) as sanctioning this view, the ambiguity of whichi has enabled the federal courts to follow a
wide range of practices. Meltzer, supra note 114, at 324-25.
'"E.g., Leach v. Florida, 132 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1961), wherein the court said that
"after a thorough investigation to determine the voluntary nature of the confession the trial judge, in sum, advised the jury that confessions which are obtained
without threat, fear, or promise of reward, and when fairly made, constitute legal
evidence. He carefully told them that such confessions should be considered along
with the other evidence. The jury was advised that it was their function to determine the credence which should be attached to a confession." Id. at 333.
mIs the trial judge's finding under the New York View that a confession is "not
involuntary" so that it may go to the jury very much different from the trial
judge's finding under the Massachusetts View that a confession is "voluntary,"
with the jury given an opportunity to pass again on the same question?
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another's crime, or for some similar reason. The whole doctrine of
corpus delicti in the criminal law is based on the proposition that even
the most voluntary confession is not alone sufficient evidence that a
crime has even been committed. 121
When these points are kept in mind it becomes evident that exclusion of confessions cannot be discussed solely in terms of whether
confessions are voluntary or involuntary, nor in terms of whether exclusion of confessions is based on competency of the evidence or on
privilege, 122 nor whether the rationale for such exclusions is an evidence theory or a due process theory. It is easy to evoke memories of
the rack, the screw, the wheel, and the other instruments of torture in
support of excluding confessions, regardless of theories or definition. 12'
The confession obtained by breaking on the rack is excluded becauseusing the evidence theory of competency, it is inherently untrustworthy and probably untruthful, or, using the due process theory of
privilege,-it was obtained by methods that offend the community's
sense of fair play and justice.
When the colorful epithets derived from history are put aside and
consideration given solely to the proper function of appellate review,
it becomes evident that the single question that can properly be considered by an appellate court is whether the trial judge should have
excluded the confession as a matter of law.1 24 Recognition of this point
""Under the better view of the corpus delecti rule, it is only necessary to establish by evidence other than the defendant's confession that a crime has been
committed. The defendant's confession alone then is sufficient to establish the
identity of the perpetrator. 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2072 (3d ed. 194o). However,
some courts have also included the identity of the perpetrator of the crime as a
part of the corpus delecti. See for instance, Lucas v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 599,
112 S.E.2d 915 (ig6o). This means that there must be corroborating evidence other
than the defendant's confession of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Wigmore said that this view was "too absurd to be argued with," since it makes the
corpus delecti cover the prosecution's entire case. 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2072 (3 d
Cd. 19-10).
2
1- In terms of definition, Professor McCormick treats confessions excluded because of untrustworthiness as being based on competency, while exclusion because
of improper police techniques savors of privilege. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Tex. L. Rev. 447, 451-57 (1938); McCormick, Some
Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 Tex. L. Rev.
239, 245 (i946)'2 rhe principal empirical study on which charges of general police brutality
in obtaining confessions is based is the 1931 report of the Wickersham Commission.
The Commission said that "the third degree-that is, the use of physical brutality,
or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary confessions or admissions- is
widespread." National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report
on Lawlessness
in Law Enforcement 4 (1931).
1
-1The Supreme Court of North Carolina, which follows the Orthodox View,
says, "The trial judge hears the evidence, observes the demeanor of the witnesses
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by the U.S. Supreme Court would have relieved the Court of some of
the questions with which it has been plagued in confession cases.
It is the trial judge who must decide in the first instance whether
the evidence on the question of voluntariness of the confession is in
conflict, and who, having due regard to conflicts in the evidence, must
decide whether the confession should go to the jury or be ruled inadmissible as a matter of law. The Supreme Court recognized in
Stein v. New Yo,'k1 25 that the trial judge has the initial responsibility
for Mr. Justice Jackson, referring to New York procedure, said that
the trial judge "may-indeed, must-exclude any confession if he is
convinced that it was not freely made or that a verdict that it was so
made would be against the weight of evidence."' 26 Moreover, if the
trial judge submits the confessions to the jury and a verdict of guilty
is returned, the trial judge has "broad powers to set aside a verdict if
1 27
he thinks the evidence does not warrant it."
In Stein the trial judge found that the confessions involved were
not involuntary as a matter of law, and in accordance with the New
York View, submitted them to the jury. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, which the trial judge sustained as not being
against the weight of the evidence. The action of the trial judge in
admitting the confessions in the first instance presented a question of
law appropriate for appellate review. Should the confessions on the
whole evidence have been ruled involuntary as a matter of law? After
the New York courts sustained the trial judge's action, the U.S. Supreme Court in reviewing the case also considered the evidence relating to the confessions and concluded that they were not involun128
tary as a matter of law.
Erroneously, though, it is submitted, the U.S. Supreme Court approached the question from the wrong end of the trial. It should have
looked only to see whether the trial judge committed constitutional
error in admitting the confessions. Instead, it looked to see whether
the trial judge committed constitutional error in sustaining the verdict of the jury at the end of the trial. If the trial judge made the
latter error, he must also have made the first one. While the first
approach leads to the heart of the issue, since the verdict of the jury
and resolves the question. The appellate court must accept the decision if it is
supported by competent evidence." State v. Outing, 255 N.C. 468, 121 S.E.2d 847, 849
(196i).
1z346 U.S. 156 (1953).
lId.
at 172.
r'Id. at 174
L'Id. at 182-88. Mr. Justice Frankfurter reached the opposite conclusion and
thought the conviction was based on "a coerced confession." Id. at 201.
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was a general one of guilty, the one followed by the Court led into
consideration of a series of hypotheticals: Did the jury find the confession to be voluntary and base its verdict thereon; or did the jury
find the confession to be involuntary, ignore it, and base a verdict
of guilt on other sufficient evidence; or did the jury follow some intermediate variation of these hypotheticals; or was the verdict a compromise; or did different jurors use different approaches to reach
a common conclusion? 29 Such an inquiry has a certain Circelike
quality, but it is quite beside the point.
From the standpoint of -appellate review, the only law question involved is whether reasonable men can differ as to whether the confession is voluntary or involuntary, and this question is not modified because the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
confession was voluntary. Where the defendant raises insanity as a
defense under a plea of not guilty, even if the state must prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence admitted on behalf of the
prosecution is not limited to that which proves sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. And if the jury returns a verdict of guilty, the court
does not inquire whether the jury might, in spite of the court's instruction, have found the defendant insane and nevertheless returned
a verdict of guilty.
The approach taken by the majority of 'the Court in Stein led to
an untenable position, which called forth vehement protests from a
minority of -the Court, protests, though, that did not take exception
to the approach itself.130 Looking at the case from the standpoint
of whether the verdict should have been set aside by the trial judge,
the Court concluded that even if the jury found the confession to be
involuntary, the conviction should be affirmed since there was other
evidence to support it. 13 1 To the charge that this meant that constitutional error could be dismissed as harmless error, the Court could
only assertively reply that the decision was based "not upon grounds
that error has been harmless, but upon the ground that we find no
32
constitutional error."'
This aspect of the Stein case was abandoned in later cases in favor
of a rule of automatic reversal of convictions, whenever an involuntary confession, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, has been

'"'Id. at 170-71.

Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas dissented.

"'Id. at 188-94. Mr. Justice Jackson phrased this question, "If the jury rejected
the confessions, could it constitutionally base a conviction on other sufficient evi-

dence?" Id. at 188.
mId. at 193.
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admitted into evidence. Mr. Justice Whitaker, speaking for the Court
in Payne v. Arkansas,133 said:
[W]here
a coerced confession constitutes a part of the evidence before the jury and a general verdict is returned, no one
can say what credit and weight the jury gave to the confession. And in these circumstances this Court has uniformly held
that even though there may have been sufficient evidence, apart
from the coerced confession, to support a judgment of conviction, the admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced
confession vitiates the judgment because it violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 134
Payne still looks at the matter from the standpoint of the trial
judge's sustaining a jury verdict. The trial proceedings are treated
as having been legally correct, thus distinguishing the situation from
those in which there has been an error in jury instructions or in the
admission of evidence, 35 so that the constitutional error found is a
factual one. A preferable approach, from the standpoint of the nature
of appellate review, would be to examine the correctness of the trial
court's ruling in letting the confession go to the jury in the first
place. Did the trial court err in ruling as a matter of law that the
confession was not involuntary? Beyond this there are no questions
for appellate review, at least at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the
states being free to follow different procedures for finally determining whether a confession is voluntary or involuntary as a matter of
fact.
An alternative possibility has been advocated by Professor Meltzer. 130 Hs suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court as a matter of constitutional law should sanction the Orthodox View and outlaw the
others. This would mean that the trial judge, and not the jury, becomes the trier of facts where there is conflict in the evidence as to
the voluntariness of the confession. It is difficult to see how this particular change resolves the difficulties or aids the defendant, as Professor Meltzer seems to think137 Already, under all views, the trial
...
356 U.S. 56a (1958).
m1 d. at 568. Stein is distinguished on the ground that no coerced confession
was found in that case. Id. at 568 n. 15. Mr. Justice Clark dissented in this case,
taking the view that Stein had held that a conviction will not be set aside if a
coerced confession is admitted into evidence if there is other sufficient evidence
to support the conviction.
See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
"3Supra note 114 at 338-39.
"roWe are not here concerned with other "reforms" suggested by Professor
Meltzer, such as whether a hearing on the voluntanness of a confession should be
held in the presence of the jury, or whether the defendant should be permitted
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judge must decide whether the confession is involuntary as a matter
of law If the trial judge is also to be the trier of fact who makes "a
clean-cut adjudication of the voluntariness issue"'138 the fact question
left to the jury is the credibility of a "voluntary" confession. Since innocent persons seldom voluntarily confess crunes, an instruction by
the judge to the jury that the confession must be accepted as voluntary
suggests rather strongly to the jury that the defendant is guilty. The
common sense mind finds it difficult to understand why a person
voluntarily confesses to a crime lie did not commit.
The point was again considered in Spano v. New York' 39 in which
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court reaffirmed a rule of
automatic reversal, saying:
"But Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 56o, 5 68, authoritatively establishes that Stein did not hold that a conviction may be sustained on the basis of other evidence if a confession found to be
involuntary by this Court was used, even though limiting instructions were given. Stein held only that when a confession
is not found by this Court to be involuntary, this Court will
not reverse on the ground that the jury might have found it
involuntary and might have relied on it."'40
The Chief Justice's language is consistent with the approach here advocated as in accordance with the nature of the appellate review. He
said that "when a confession is not found by this Court to be invol" In other words, if the confesuntary, this Court will not reverse
of law, and so inadmissible
as
a
matter
sion is not ruled involuntary
Court will not make any
Supreme
the
the
first
place,
in evidence in
further inquiry as to how the jury characterized the confession or what
credit the jury gave to it.141
Some doubt, though, must be expressed as to whether the Court
really meant this, or that this represents a final, settled position. The
reasons [or these doubts have three principal bases: (i) A matter of
semantics; (2) The opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter for the Court
in Rogers v. Richmond. and (3)The Supreme Court's own precedents on the technique of fact finding in its own review of these confession cases.
Firstly, as to semantics. Does the phrase "not found by this Court
to be involuntary" mean "not involuntary," or is it a double negative
to take the stand on this question, wvithout being vulnerable to cross-examination
on the merits. Ibid.
1-13d. at 338.
2'36o U.S. 315 (1959)'Old. at 324.
1
"Supra text beginning at note 124.
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expressing the affirmative and meaning that the Court will reverse
unless the confession is affirmatively "found by this Court to be voluntary?" When the evidence is in conflict, the distinction may have farreaching significance.
Secondly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in
Rogers v. Rzchmond -42 both. supports the view being suggested and
leaves the issue in confusion. In the early paragraphs the Justice says
"the trial judge ruled" and the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut sustained "the trial judge's admission of the confession" and
that "the attention of the trial judge" was focused on the wrong
standard, concluding:
may go to the jury only
"This means that a vital confession
with correct constiin
accordance
if it is subjected to screening
43
tutional standards."
All of this indicates that the Court was reviewing the trial judge's
ruling as to whether the confessions should go to the jury. But then
the Justice confuses the issue by talking about "trial judge or trial
jury-whichever is charged by state law with the duty of finding fact
pertinent to a claim of coercion" 144 as though the jury's findings of
fact were or might be the subject of review.
In Spano, Chief Justice Warren said that the Court would not reverse if the confession was not found to be involuntary even though
"the jury might have found it involuntary and might have relied on
it."145 In Rogers, however, Mr. Justice Frankfurter says that the U.S.
Supreme Court will reverse if a trial jury passes upon a defendant's
claim of coercion "under an erroneous standard of constitutional
law."140 Why should the U.S. Supreme Court reverse if, as Justice
Frankfurter says, the jury using an erroneous standard finds the confession to be voluntary, and yet not reverse if, as the Chief Justice says,
the jury using a correct standard finds the confession to be involuntary?
Obliquely, Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems to give an answer to
such an inquiry in this passage:
"A state defendant should have the opportunity to have all
issues which may be determinative of his guilt tried by a state
"2365 U.S. 534 (196i).
143

1d. at 545. (Emphasis added).
"Id. at 546. However, the Justice in the last footnote to his opinion again says
that the reason for reversal is "the application of an erroneous standard to his
federal claim by the state trial judge in allowing the confessions to go to the Jury.
Id. at 548 n.51

" Supra text at note
"6365 U.S. at 546-

i4o.
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judge or a state jury under appropriate state procedures which
conform to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 47
Since the opinion, however, gives no recognition to different procedures followed in the states, it is difficult to determine precisely
what is the Justice's meaning. He speaks of the state judge and the
state jury in the alternative, as though one or the other, but never
both, consider confessions in determining the issue of the defendant's
guilt. Furthermore, the Justice seems to ignore entirely the fact that
the credibility of even the voluntary confession has always been left
to the jury.
According to the Rogers opinion, the test under the fourteenth
amendment is "whether the behavior of the State's law enforcement
officials was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring
about confessions not freely self-determined-a question to be answered
with complete disregard of whether or not [the defendant] in fact
spoke the truth."'148 When this test is given to the jury does it mean
that the jury must determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
but in doing so they are completely barred from considering the
truth or falsity of the defendant's confession? Obviously, this is absurd. Therefore, Mr. Justice Frankfurter must mean that the jury
is to be given two standards and make two determinations. Firstly,
the jury must determine whether the confession was "voluntary" under
the test set forth above, this being a determination made without
reference to the truth or falsity of the confession. Secondly, the jury
will be expected to inquire as to the truth or falsity of the confession,
and on this point its voluntary character will be relevant. But since
there will likely be little evidence regarding this, other than the evidence relating to how the confession was obtained, the "first" determination that the confession was voluntary will almost inevitably
lead to a "second" determination that the confession was truthful.
Again, the jury will be asking why a person "voluntarily" confesses
unless he is guilty.
Unless the jury is to be permitted to consider their truth or falsity,
confessions are not even relevant and ought not to be admitted in
evidence. Consequently, Justice Frankfurter's statement that the jury
when applying a constitutional test must completely disregard the
truth or falsity of the confession cannot be a complete statement regarding the nature of the jury's consideration of the confession.
2171d. at 547-48.
"18Id. at 544.
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Furthermore, if it is constitutionally permissible for the states to
follow the Orthodox View and leave -the determination of the voluntariness of the confession to the judge alone, it ought also to be permissible for states to follow the Massachusetts view, which does all
this and in addition gives the defendant the benefit of a second determination on the same issue. If a state following the Massachusetts
view chooses to use a different, even an erroneous standard, in submittng the question to the jury, surely the defendant is in no worse
position than under the Orthodox View.
The major difficulty, then, in the Rogers opinion is that it shows no
appreciation of the distinction between the competency of evidence
going to the jury and the credibility of the evidence the jury receives,
a difficulty that would be obviated if Supreme Court review was limited to the question of competency, -that is, the trial judge's determination of whether the confession should go to the jury in the first
place.
If the proper scope of review for the Supreme Court is of the
trial judge's initial- admission of the confessions, the question arises
as to how a trial judge decides as a matter of law whether a confession
is involuntary and so inadmissible in evidence, or not involuntary and
admissible. Does he look at all the evidence and take the view most
favorable to the prosecution; or looking at all the evidence take the
view most favorable to the defendant; or put aside all conificting
evidence and look only at the uncontradicted evidence; or does he
take still some other approach?
Suppose, for example, the gist of the defendant's claim is that the
confession was obtained as the result of physical violence by the police, but the alleged violence is categorically denied by the police.
Obviously, there is a crucial conflict in the evidence. If the trial judge
takes the view most favorable to the state, he will find that there
was no physical violence and admit the confession. Such an approach
would enable the police, simply by lying, to secure admission of the
confession. On the other hand, the trial judge could take the view
most favorable to the defendant and find that there was physical violence and so rule the confession to be involuntary as a matter of law.
This approach would enable the defendant, simply by lying, to secure
a denial of the admission of the confession. The trial judge could look
only at the uncontradicted evidence, which would mean that he would
disregard the crucial issue. None of these approaches are satisfactory.
It would seem that the trial judge must look at the total evidence,
including a consideration of the demeanor of the witnesses, and on
this view of the total evidence determine whether as a matterr of law
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the confession is involuntary. The trial judge does not have to resolve
every conflict in the evidence. He is searching for the truth, and indications as to which witness is lying and which one is telling the
truth is of greater significance than certainty as to any specific detail.
If this is the proper method of approach for the trial judge, it is
apparent that under present precedents the U.S. Supreme Court uses
quite a different approach to determine the correctness of the trial
judge's decision. This is a third reason for feeling doubts that the
Supreme Court really meant what it said in Spano. The Supreme Court
says that it looks only to the uncontradicted evidence. Since in the
situation supposed the evidence is in conflict as to whether there has
been physical violence, the Court, in theory at least, disregards the
entire matter and looks for some other uncontradicted details. The
unsatisfacory nature of this method of review would seem apparent.
But, as has already been pointed out, it is to be doubted whether
the Court, in spite of its expressions on the matter, does entirely ignore the evidence in conflict. Why is the presence of conflicting evidence so often referred to, if it is ignored in reaching decisions?
IV

CONCLUSION

For the last quarter century the U.S. Supreme Court has been reviewing and reversing state convictions on the ground that 'they were
based on involuntary confessions. In doing so the Court has spoken in
terms of a search for a fact-whether the defendant at the time he confessed had an involuntary state of mind. To meet the difficulties inherent in fact finding by an -appellate court sitting miles distant in
space and years distant in time from the actual scene, the Court says
that it considers only the uncontradicted facts, but the Court also
says it looks at the totality of the circumstances. The Court is seemingly unaware that it cannot do both, since these two approaches are
mutually exclusive, and contradictory whenever the evidence on crucial points is in conflict.
Furthermore, the Court has never been able to decide precisely
what it is that is being reviewed: the trial judge's admission of the
confession in the first place; the instructions .the trial judge gives the
jury regarding the confession; the jury's finding of fact regarding
the confession, cloaked beneath the mantle of a general verdict of
guilty; or the trial judge's refusal to set aside the verdict of guilty
returned by the jury. This article has undertaken to show that the
only proper subject for appellate review at the level of the U.S.
Supreme Court is the trial judge's initial admission of the confession
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into evidence. If it is found that the trial judge used proper standards,
and that his decision on admissibility is supported by the evidence, the
function of appellate review has been performed.
Appellate review of any of the trial proceedings other than the
trial judge's ruling that the confession is admissible into evidence is
open to some objection. Since the trial judge, using the Orthodox
View, can finally determine that the confession is voluntary and give
the jury binding instructions to that effect, there can be nothing constitutionally wrong in the New York and Massachusetts Views under
which the defendant has the additional benefit of a second determination, by the jury, of the issue of voluntariness. And if the trial judge
has used the correct standard to admit the confession in the first place,
the defendant cannot be prejudiced if the greater benefits accorded to
him under these latter views involve the use of different or even theoretically erroneous standards. The attempt to look behind a jury
general verdict of guilty, as has been done in some of the cases, to
find out how the jury characterized a confession, or whether the jury
relied upon it or on some other evidence, is both unrealistic and fanciful. While a trial judge's refusal to set aside a verdict of guilty does
provide an appropriate subject for appellate review, at this stage of
the trial there are other factors involved in reviewing the trial judge's
admission of the confession into evidence. That question is presented
in clear-cut form only at the beginning of the trial.
The fixing of precisely what it is that the Supreme Court is reviewing-the trial judge's initial admission of the confession clarifies the
difficulty inherent in such review. It has been pointed out that the
trial judge can properly determine whether a confession should be
ruled inadmissible as a matter of law only by considering the total
evidence in an endeavor to find where the truth lies. If the trial judge
must, thus, consider the conflicting evidence in making his ruling,
can an appellate court reviewing the correctness of the ruling do less?
Since the Supreme Court cannot by looking solely at uncontradicted evidence determine whether a trial judge who has looked at
the total evidence made a correct ruling, the "uncontradicted facts"
rule should be abolished. An example will clarify this point, if clarification is necessary. Suppose the defendant should allege that the
confession was obtained by physical violence, the violence consisting
of a twisting of his arms. The police deny that the defendant's right
arm was twisted. Presumably, the record now contains uncontradicted
evidence that the police did twist the defendant's left arm. Surely,
though, the "fact" of police violence has been established only in a
most superficial and abstract way. The conflicting evidence regarding
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the twisting of the defendant's right arm shows that someone was
lying. If a police lie on this point can be established, it would be reasonable to infer that the police also lied about twisting the left arm.
If, on the other hand, the defendant lied about the police twisting
his right arm, it is reasonable to infer that the defendant also lied
about the twisting of the other arm. The lack of an explicit denial
does not establish the truth of the allegation, especially if it is reasonably evident that the defendant did lie about twisting the right
arm. The lacuna of the record may be due to a lapse by the prosecutor on direct examination, the adroitness of the defense attorney on
cross-examination, or for some other reason evident to the trial judge,
but which was never expressly stated and put in writing so as to be
patent to the U.S. Supreme Court on the remote, very remote at the
time, chance that Court some years later would search the record for"uncontradicted fact."
Someone may point out that this analysis means, since the Supreme Court cannot resolve conflicting evidence, that the Court must
simply accept as final, state determinations of fact in confession cases,
and so the Court will fail to discharge its oft-asserted responsibility
to make an independent determination of the facts to insure that
the defendant's constitutional rights have not been violated. The point
is, of course, well taken. Nevertheless, if fact-finding is not consistent
with appellate review, it can hardly be said that there is any responsibility on the Court to assume the function. If the responsibility is selfassumed, it may, with propriety, be laid aside. But if there is a responsibility on the Court to find facts in confession cases, which is
here denied, no amount of legal writing can be of any assistance to
the process. The gift of omniscence must be sought from sources other
than the pages of law reviews, legal tomes, and court opinions.
Actually, the burden of the analysis contained in this article is
that the U.S. Supreme Court, in spite of what it says, has in any realistic sense long since abandoned fact-finding in confession cases. Essentially, the Court searches for significant symbolic details, or badges
of coercion. While the Court speaks in terms of looking at the effect
the police methods had on the state of mind of the individual to
induce a confession, in reality the Court looks to the personal characteristics of the defendant to determine the propriety of the methods
used by the police.
In principle, though not in name, the rule of MacNabb v. United
States has already been extended to state confession cases. It is only the
full rigor of the rule that is still to follow. There are no basic differences in the views of at least a majority of the Court, although
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they prefer to express those views in separate opinions. For example,
there almost always appears to be a division among the three justices
who have been longest on the bench, Justices Frankfurter, Black, and
Douglas. and who, therefore, have considered the largest number of
state confession cases. All three Justices are in basic agreement that
convictions based on confessions obtained by improper police methods
should be reversed, and that no inquiry into the actual effect of the
police methods on the person confessing is required. In deterrmning
what are improper police methods, Justice Frankfurter prefers a subjective, almost omniscient approach, while Justices Black and Douglas
prefer what is, superficially at least, a more objective approach, based
on automatic reversal whenever the police have acted illegally. In fact
the justices are so close together in viewpoint that one might say that
the Frankfurter reasoning provides the best rationale for the BlackDouglas conclusion, and the Black-Douglas conclusion provides the
best argument against the Frankfurter rationale. Although the approach of justices Black and Douglas involves drawing a line at
a somewhat different point than under Justice Frankfurter's view, in
the final analysis it will likely prove as subjective. This is because the
police have traditionally questioned suspects in an endeavor to solve
crimes, so that there is no body of present law determining precisely
what is illegal police conduct in obtaining confessions. In making this
determination the Black-Douglas approach will prove to be as subjective as that of Justice Frankfurter.
On the somewhat more distant horizon there are two other possibilities that may bring a drastic solution to the confession problem.
The members of the Court, and most particularly Justices Douglas
and Black, have frequently adverted to the fact that confession cases
usually also involve a denial of counsel. It is entirely possible that a
majority of the Court will eventually conclude that the use of any confession made while the defendant has been denied counsel violates the
fourteenth amendent. This view will largely eliminate the confession
problem by eliminating the confessions. The other possibility derives from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's frequent description of the rationale of the exclusion of confessions in terms indicating that it is essentially a privilege against self-incrimination. If the Court accepts the
view that the use of a confession violates the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination, the confession problem will also be solved
by eliminating all confessions.
The Supreme Court rule on confessions has not yet become stabilized. In fact it could not be stabilized as long as an apparent semantical certainty cloaks intrinsic contradictions. An eventual settled
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rule will be the result of a striving for greater certainty. This could
be the result of giving greater credit and finality to state findings of
fact in criminal cases involving confessions. Present prospects though
suggest an effort will be made to achieve greater certainty through extension of the McNabb rule to the states.
The last confession case decided at the 196o Term was Culoinbe
v. Co77n7ectzcut, 49 which covers seventy-five pages of the official reports, without any expression of viewpoint securing the support of a
majority of the justices. The question argued seems basically to have
been, "Should the McNabb rule be extended to the states?" On the
same day that Culombe was decided the Court also decided Mapp v.
Ohio.17,° There is no basis in logic for the extension of the Weeks rule
to the states, which will not also support an extension of the McNabb
rule. It would not have taken very much work on the part of a legalistically minded gremlin to have garbled the opinions in Culombe
and Mapp so that the states would now be under the McNabb rule,
but still free of the Weeks rule. As it is, there are strong prospects
that the Supreme Court will, without the aid of gremlins, soon extend
McNabb to the states.

11367 U.S. 568 (ig6i).
';367 U.S. 643 (196i).
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